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Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co.: Workers' Compensation
and Mental Injuries
Workers' compensation statutes restrict certain rights both employers and
employees otherwise enjoy under common-law tort principles. In return, com-
pensation statutes assure employees recovery for loss of earning capacity with-
out regard to fault. Employers are shielded from unpredictable judgments by
statutory limits on payments to injured employees and by provisions that make
the workers' compensation statute the employee's exclusive remedy for injuries
within its scope.' Although intended by legislatures to reduce civil litigation of
injuries suffered in an employment context, 2 the exclusive remedy provisions of
workers' compensation acts have themselves spawned much litigation over the
coverage of the compensation acts. One source of controversy is whether mental
injuries 3 fall within the scope of the statutes. In Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club
Co. 4 the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed this issue and held that
plaintiffs' civil actions against their former employer for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress5 were not barred by the exclusivity provision of the North
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act (the Act).6 This Note analyzes the rea-
soning underlying the court's decision in Hogan and explores the various scena-
rios that logically follow from the decision. The Note concludes that application
of the rule in Hogan will result in inequitable variations from case to case in the
remedies available to an injured plaintiff.
Marlene Hogan, April Cornatzer, and Sonya Mitchell, all former employ-
ees of Forsyth Country Club, jointly sought damages in a civil action for injuries
suffered as the result of alleged tortious acts of defendant club's general manager
and chef.7 Although the specific incidents alleged by each plaintiff differed, all
three plaintiffs' claims were based on sexual harassment.8 For April Cornatzer,
1. See infira text accompanying notes 23-26 (discussing the basic compromise inherent in
workers' compensation acts, including the exclusive remedy provision); see also infra notes 31-53 and
accompanying text (discussing North Carolina's exclusivity provision).
2. See 1 W. SCHNEIDER, SCHNEIDER'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4 (1941).
3. Courts and commentators alternatively have referred to such injuries as mental, psychologi-
cal, nervous, psychic, and emotional. This Note uses these designations interchangeably to refer to
injuries having no physical manifestations.
4. 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, disc rev. denied, 317 N.C. 334, 346 S.E.2d 140 (1986).
5. The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is comprised of the following ele-
ments: (1) an intent to cause emotional distress, (2) extreme and outrageous behavior, and (3) severe
emotional distress caused by this behavior. PROSSER AND KEaTON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12, at
60-65 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
North Carolina recognized the tort in the form of "trespass to the person" in 1936. See Kirby
v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936). In 1979 the North Carolina
Supreme Court formally adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Stan-
back v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181, 254 S.E.2d 611 (1979).
6. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 488, 340 S.E.2d at 120. The North Carolina Workers' Compensa-
tion Act is codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -122 (1985 & Supp. 1986). For a discussion of the
exclusive remedy provision of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, see infra notes 31-53
and accompanying text.
7. See Plaintiff-Appellants' Brief at 1, Hogan (No. 8521SC292).
8. Hogan had acted as the dining room manager and hostess. Record on Appeal at 1-2, 73-74,
Hogan (No. 8521SC292). She alleged that chef Hans Pfeiffer shouted profanities at her, called her
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this sexual harassment allegedly extended to unwanted sexual advances and sug-
gestive physical contact. 9
Each plaintiff filed a civil action against Forsyth Country Club for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful termination, and negligent reten-
tion of an employee.10 The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment on all claims.' 1 The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision on the claims of Hogan and Mitchell for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress 12 and negligent retention of an employee, 13 and on all
three plaintiffs' claims of wrongful termination. 14 However, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court on Cornatzer's claims of intentional infliction of emo-
sexually derogatory names, chased her in a threatening manner, and interfered with employees
under her supervision. Id. Hogan further alleged that when she complained to general manager
Clifford Smith about this harassment, he refused to take action to remedy the situation. Id.
April Coratzer had been a waitress under Hogan's supervision. According to her complaint,
Pfeiffer made sexual advances toward her and rubbed against her in a sexually suggestive manner.
Id. at 5, 75. She further claimed that when she refused his overtures, he began to harass her in ways
similar to those alleged by Hogan. Id. Moreover, he placed her in fear of bodily harm. Id. Finally,
Cornatzer asserted that the club's general manager at the time, Richard Brennan, failed to take any
steps to control Pfeiffer. Id. at 5-6, 75. Brennan had notice of the chef's conduct because Cornatzer
had complained to him repeatedly. Id.
Plaintiff Sonya Mitchell served as a housekeeper or maid. She alleged that when she was six
months pregnant, Brennan refused her request for a pregnancy leave, and thereafter he became
abusive to her by making her lift heavy linen bundles in violation of a physician's orders. Id. at 9,
76. Late in the pregnancy, she experienced labor pains and was instructed by her doctor to go to the
hospital. Id. at 9, 76-77. Mitchell claimed that Brennan threatened to fire her if she left for the
hospital. When she went to the hospital, Brennan terminated her employment. Id. All three plain-
tiffs further asserted that Brennan and Pfeiffer were often intoxicated while at work, which aggra-
vated the abusive behavior. Id. at 73, 75, 77.
9. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
10. Hogan, Cornatzer, and Mitchell sought, respectively, $3,700,000, $4,300,000, and
$4,300,000 in actual and punitive damages. Record on Appeal at 1, 4-5, 8, 11-12, Hogan.
11. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 486, 340 S.E.2d at 119. On a motion for summary judgment, the
court must address itself to "whether there exists any genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 487, 340
S.E.2d at 119 (citing Zimmerman v. Hogg & Allen, 286 N.C. 24, 209 S.E.2d 795 (1974)). Material
offered either to support or to defeat the motion must be taken "in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the motion." Bradshaw v. McElroy, 62 N.C. App. 515, 518, 302 S.E.2d 908, 911
(1983).
12. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 486-87, 340 S.E.2d at 119. The conduct Hogan and Mitchell
complained of did not meet the "extreme and outrageous conduct" test. Id. at 493-94, 340 S.E.2d at
123. Concerning the chef's behavior toward Hogan, the court stated: "While we do not condone
Pfeiffer's intemperate conduct, neither do we believe that his alleged acts 'exceed all bounds usually
tolerated by a decent society.'" Id. at 493, 340 S.E.2d at 123 (quoting Stanback v. Stanback, 297
N.C. 181, 196, 254 S.E.2d 611, 622 (1979)). The court found Brennan's actions toward Mitchell to
be "unjustified," but insufficient to support Mitchell's claim. Id. at 494, 340 S.E.2d at 123.
13. The court deemed these claims deficient because plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a viable
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 496-97, 340 S.E.2d at 124-25. Without a
showing that an employee has tortiously injured the plaintiff, no basis exists for a claim of negligence
against the employer for hiring or retaining that employee. Pleasants v. Barnes, 221 N.C. 173, 177,
19 S.E.2d 627, 629 (1942).
14. Under North Carolina law, employment contracts having no specified term are terminable
at the will of either party. Still v. Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971). The court of appeals
in Hogan refused to "articulate a public policy exception" to this doctrine to cover the circumstances
present in Hogan. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 498, 340 S.E.2d at 126. The court interpreted Sides v.
Duke Hospital, 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818, disc. rev. denied, 314 N.C. 331, 335 S.E.2d 13
(1985), as recognizing the sole, very narrow exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine-an em-
ployee at will who is terminated "in retaliation for (.) his refusal to perform an act prohibited by
law, or (2.) his performance of an act required by law" has a cause of action against the employer.
Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 498, 340 S.E.2d at 126.
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tional distress and negligent retention of an employee" Stating that "[n]o per-
son should have to be subjected to non-consensual sexual touchings, constant
suggestive remarks and on-going sexual harassment... without being afforded
remedial recourse through our legal system," 16 the Hogan court held that
Cornatzer alleged sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct to support her
claim against Pfeiffer for intentional infliction of emotional distress.1 7 In addi-
tion, the evidence indicated that defendant employer had ratified Pfeiffer's con-
duct. Thus, the claim established sufficient grounds for an action against the
country club. 18
Having concluded that Cornatzer had a viable claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, the court addressed whether her claim should never-
theless be barred by the Act. The court noted that the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress essentially is nonphysical and "the injuries al-
leged by plaintiff [did] not involve physical injuries resulting in disability''1 -
that is, plaintiff's injuries were psychic rather than physical. Thus, the court
concluded that a civil action could be maintained because the injury suffered was
part of "an entire class of civil wrongs" 20 outside the scope of the Act.21 In
addition, the court upheld Cornatzer's claim for negligent retention of an
employee.
22
15. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 500, 340 S.E.2d at 127. A judgment dated December 5, 1986,
eventually was entered for plaintiff Cornatzer in the amount of $900,000, comprised of $150,000
actual damages and $750,000 punitive damages. Judgment dated December 5, 1986, Hogan. On
December 18, 1986, this judgment was overturned and a new trial granted on all issues. Judgment
dated December 18, 1986, Hogan.
16. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 491, 340 S.E.2d at 121.
17. Id.
18. Brennan, as general manager, had authority to act on the club's behalf in personnel matters.
However, whether his actions constituted "an [intent] to acquiesce in, approve and ratify Pfeiffer's
act [was] a question for the jury." Id. at 492-93, 340 S.E.2d at 122.
In North Carolina, as in other jurisdictions, an employer may be liable for the torts of his or her
employee on any of the following theories: (1) express authorization of the employee's conduct, (2)
vicarious liability for all tortious conduct of the employee within the "scope of employment," (3)
ratification of the employee's acts, (4) negligence of the employer in employing or dealing with the
employee, (5) conduct of the employee in violation of a nondelegable duty, or (6) apparent author-
ity of the employee. I RE.SATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 218-19 (1958).
The Hogan court was unable to find evidence indicating Pfeiffer had acted within the scope of
his employment, Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 492, 340 S.E.2d at 122, which North Carolina courts have
defined as requiring that the tortious act be "in the prosecution and furtherance of the business
which was given him to do," Overton v. Henderson, 28 N.C. App. 699, 701, 222 S.E.2d 724, 726
(1976), Rather, "it [appeared] that he was acting in pursuit of some corrupt or lascivious purpose of
his own." Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 492, 340 S.E.2d at 122. This finding could have provided another
avenue for deciding the workers' compensation issue. See infra notes 104-08 and accompanying
text.
19. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 490, 340 S.E.2d at 121.
20. Id. at 489, 340 S.E.2d at 120.
21. Id. An action could be brought notwithstanding the Act's exclusive remedy provision. Id.
at 490, 340 SE.2d at 121.
22. The court upheld this claim because plaintiff (1) had a cause of action for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, and (2) offered evidence that the general manager knew of Pfeiffer's pro-
clivity for sexual harassment when he hired the chef. Id. at 495, 340 S.E.2d at 124. The court,
however, did not decide whether the country club's management acted negligently in hiring and
retaining Pfeiffer despite having notice of his tendencies. Whether defendant had acted as a "reason-
able and prudent employer" was a question of material fact appropriate for the jury. Id.
In rejecting defendant's assertion that this claim was barred by the exclusive remedy provision
FVol. 65
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Workers' compensation statutes seek to balance the interests of both em-
ployers and employees2 3 by requiring each group to compromise certain rights
in return for corresponding gains. 24 Employers must compensate injuries with-
out regard to fault, and, in return, compensation statutes protect employers
from large judgments.2 5 Although employees are assured recovery for loss of
earning capacity, they must relinquish any right to a civil remedy yielding full
compensation and possible punitive damages.
2 6
North Carolina General Statutes section 97-9 sets forth one side of this
equation by providing for certain, but limited, compensation. The statute pro-
vides that "[e]very employer... shall secure the payment of compensation to his
employees.., and.., he or those conducting his business shall only be liable to
any employee for personal injury or death by accident to the extent and in the
manner herein specified." 2 7 The compensation scheme is premised on the no-
tion of "disability," defined as "incapacity because of injury to earn the wages
which the employee was receiving at the time of injury in the same or any other
employment." s2 8 Loss of wages forms the basis for calculating benefits, 29 and the
of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1985), the court
stated that sexual harassment is not a risk peculiar to employment and therefore does not "arise out
of" employment. Under § 97-3 of the Act, only injuries arising out of employment fall within the
scope of the Act. Id. § 97-3. Thus, sexual harassment is outside the scope of the Act. Hogan, 79
N.C. App. at 496, 340 S.E.2d at 124. For a discussion of the "arising out of" employment require-
ment, see infra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
23. 2A A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.11 (1983).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The purposes of compensation under workers' compensation statutes differ substan-
tially from the objectives of the tort system. Statutory benefits are aimed at relieving the community
of the burden of supporting injured employees, while the tort system seeks to restore plaintiffs to the
position they held prior to being injured. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 2.50; see also Kellams v.
Carolina Metal Prods., Inc., 248 N.C. 199, 203, 102 S.E.2d 841, 844 (1958) (minimum and maxi-
mum awards consistent with statute's purpose "to relieve against hardship rather than to afford full
compensation"); Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943) (noting that the
Workers' Compensation Act "compelfs] industry to take care of its own wreckage").
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (1985).
28. Id. § 97-2(9).
29. Section 97-29 furnishes the basic formula for complete incapacity:
Except as hereinafter otherwise provided, where the incapacity for work resulting
from the injury is total, the employer shall pay or cause to be paid, as hereinafter provided,
to the injured employee during such total disability a weekly compensation equal to sixty-six
and two-thirds percent (66 2/3%) of his average weekly wages, but not more than the
amount established annually to be effective October 1 as provided herein, nor less than
thirty dollars ($30) per week.
In cases of total and permanent disability, compensation, including reasonable and
necessary nursing services, medicines, sick travel, medical, hospital, and other treatment or
care of [sic] rehabilitative services shall be paid for by the employer during the lifetime of
the injured employee. If death results from the injury then the employer shall pay compen-
sation in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 97-38....
... [O]n July 1 of each year... a maximum weekly benefit amount shall be computed.
The amount of this maximum weekly benefit shall be derived by obtaining the average
weekly insured wage in accordance with G.S. 96-8(22)... and this said maximum weekly
benefit shall be applicable to all injuries and claims arising on and after January 1 following
such computation.
Id. § 97-29 (emphasis added).
When disability is only partial the Act provides for weekly compensation of "sixty-six and two-
thirds percent (66 2/3%) of the difference between his average weekly wages before the injury and
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statutory definition of injury is critical in determining whether a compensable
disability exists. The North Carolina Act provides that "'[ijnjury and personal
injury' shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment .... "30
The other provision integral to the statutory compromise of the Act is
North Carolina General Statutes section 97-10.1,31 which makes compensation
under the Act the employee's sole remedy against the employer "[i]f the em-
ployee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the provisions of
this [Act]."'32 Despite the seemingly definitive language of the exclusivity provi-
sion, the North Carolina Supreme Court has removed the section's protection
from employers who inflict injury through their intentional acts.3 3 The courts
have concluded that "'to allow the employer deliberately to batter his helper,
and then compel the worker to accept moderate workmen's compensation bene-
fits, either from his insurance carrier or from himself as self-insurer'" would
defy sound reason.
34
the average weekly wages which he is able to earn thereafter" for no more than 300 weeks. The
annual maximum specified in § 97-29 applies. Id. § 97-30. Certain injuries-primarily loss of parts
of the body-are covered by § 97-3 1, which permits compensation to continue through "the healing
period and in addition the disability shall be deemed to continue" for a specified number of weeks.
Id. § 97-31.
30. Id. § 97-2(6). A wealth of case law has been devoted to construction of this definition. See,
e.g., Perry v. American Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 274, 136 S.E.2d 643, 645 (1964) ("Arising out of
and in the course of" means the employee is engaged in an authorized activity that is intended to
further the employer's business.); Hardy v. Small, 246 N.C. 581, 584, 99 S.E.2d 862, 865 (1957) (To
"arise out of" employment, an injury must result from risk to which the general public is not sub-
ject.); Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 726, 153 S.E. 266, 268 (1930) (An accident
is an "unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by the person who suffers
the injury.").
31. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10.1 (1985).
32. The exclusive remedy provision provides:
If the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the provisions of
this Article, then the rights and remedies herein granted to the employee, his dependents,
next of kin, or personal representative shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the
employee, his dependents, next of kin, or representative as against the employer at common
law or otherwise on account of such injury or death.
Id.
33. See Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952). The North Carolina Supreme
Court recently refined this principle in Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 315 N.C. 500, 340 S.E.2d
295 (1986). In Barrino the father and estate administrator of an employee killed in a factory explo-
sion alleged that the employer had violated the National Electrical Code and North Carolina's Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act, failed to inspect adequately equipment utilizing liquefied
combustible gases, violated safety regulations related to this equipment, and turned off or concealed
various warning and detection devices. Id. at 502-04, 340 S.E.2d at 297-98. A divided court held
that willful, wanton, and reckless conduct of the employer does not give rise to a civil suit as does
intentional conduct; the exclusivity provision bars such actions. Id. at 507, 340 S.E.2d at 300. For
an analysis of the rationales underlying the Barrino decision, see Note, Pleasant v. Johnson: The
North Carolina Supreme Court Enters the Twilight Zone-Is a Co-employee Liable in Tort for Will-
ful, Reckless, and Wanton Conduct?, 64 N.C.L. REv. 688, 702-04 (1986).
34. Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 733-34, 69 S.E.2d 6, 10 (1952) (quoting S. HoRovrrz,
INJURY AND DEATH UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS 336 (1944)).
Although North Carolina has adopted this doctrine through judicial interpretation of the
Workers' Compensation Act, other states' acts expressly provide the employee may pursue both a
civil and a statutory remedy when an employer commits an intentional tort. See, eg., ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23-1022A (Supp. 1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032 (West 1985); OR. REV.
STAT. § 656.156(2) (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 23-
4-2 (1985).
[Vol. 65
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North Carolina courts have also limited the exclusivity provision in other
contexts. In Andrews v. Peters 35 the North Carolina Court of Appeals held the
exclusivity provision inapplicable to intentional conduct of a co-employee. 36 In
Andrews an employee walked up behind plaintiff and placed his knee behind
plaintiff's knee.37 Plaintiff fell and sustained injuries. 38 The court reasoned that
because the North Carolina General Assembly had decided "economic loss
should be absorbed by the industry and ultimately passed on to the consumer,"
employees are not subject to actions in tort for damage caused by their negligent
acts.39 The Andrews court, however, concluded that "an intentional tort is not
the type of 'industrial accident' to which [the] legislature intended to give a co-
employee immunity. To hold otherwise [would be] to remove responsibility
from the co-employee for his intentional conduct."
' 4
The exclusive remedy provision remains a bar to civil actions against em-
ployers for the intentional, tortious acts of one employee against another. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals reached this conclusion in Daniels v. Swof-
ford.4 1 Daniels involved an intentional assault by one employee on another.4 2
The court first considered whether the assault constituted an "accident arising
out of and in the course of employment. '4 3 Because North Carolina courts pre-
viously had defined accident from the injured employee's viewpoint," the Dan-
iels court concluded that an assault may constitute an accident within the
meaning of the Act despite the actor's intent.4 5 Moreover, the alleged assault
was not personally motivated, but occurred while plaintiff and her co-employee
were discussing plaintiff's job performance.4 6 Therefore, plaintiff's injury arose
35. 55 N.C. App. 124, 284 S.E.2d 748 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 395, 290 S.E.2d 364
(1982).
36. Id. at 125, 284 S.E.2d at 749.
In Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 325 S.E.2d 244 (1985), the North Carolina Supreme
Court addressed the issue of willful, reckless, and wanton conduct of co-employees, as it later did in
Barrino, with regard to employers' actions. The Pleasant court held that the injured employee could
recover under the Workers' Compensation Act as well as in tort against the co-employee. Id. at 711,
325 S.E.2d at 246. For a comparison of Barrino and Pleasant, see Note, supra note 33, at 702-04.
37. Andrews, 55 N.C. App. at 124, 284 S.E.2d at 748.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 126-27, 284 S.E.2d at 750.
40. Id. at 127, 284 S.E.2d at 750. The court cited with approval several state statutes that
permit an action in tort against a co-employee for purposeful acts. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-1022 (Supp. 1971-1980); CAL. LAB. CODE § 3601(a)(1) (West Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 31-293 (West 1972); HAw. REV. STAT. § 386-8 (1976); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1032
(West Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-413 (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp.
1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.018(3)( a) (1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 72 (Purdon Supp. 1980);
W. VA. CODE § 23-2-6a (1981).
41. 55 N.C. App. 555, 286 S.E.2d 582 (1982).
42. Id. Plaintiff alleged that the president of the company verbally abused her while criticizing
her job performance, followed her down the hall, and kicked her in the back of the leg. Record on
Appeal at 2-3, Daniels (No. 80CvS200).
43. Daniels, 55 N.C. App. at 558, 286 S.E.2d at 584.
44. An accident is "an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed by
the injured employee." Harding v. Thomas & Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 428, 124 S.E.2d 109, 110-
11 (1962); see Conrad v. Cook-Lewis Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 726, 153 S.E. 266, 268 (1930).
45. Daniels, 55 N.C. App. at 558, 286 S.E.2d at 584.
46. Id.
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out of and in the course of employment.47
Having decided that the co-employee assault met the statutory definition of
injury, the Daniels court addressed itself to the exclusivity provision. The court
of appeals recognized that North Carolina courts had created an exception to
the exclusivity rule for the employer's intentional acts.48 The court then noted
that this exception is founded on the idea that" 'the same person cannot commit
an intentional assault and then allege it was accidental.' "49 In the case of a co-
employee assault the actor and defendant are not the same person, and therefore
no salient reason exists for removal of the employer's immunity from suit.50
The court in Daniels recognized that a limited exception to this rule exists when
the defendant employer is a corporation and the assaultive employee is effec-
tively its alter ego. In such situations the two should be treated as one and a
civil action should be allowed.51 Despite the fact the co-employee in Daniels
acted as president of the company, he was not alleged to be its alter ego, "nor
[was] there any evidence ... from which [the court could] conclude that Mr.
Swofford was so acting."'52 Thus, plaintiff's action was barred by the exclusivity
provision.
5 3
To be consistent with Andrews and Daniels, Hogan could have been decided
on the basis of the nature of the conduct involved.54 The court, however, distin-
guished Andrews and Daniels on the basis that both cases dealt with assaultive
conduct resulting in physical injury.55 In contrast, plaintiffs in Hogan did not
seek redress for "any physical or mental illness nor [did] they allege employment
disability or loss of earning capacity."' 56 The court in Hogan therefore declined
an opportunity to base its decision on established doctrine.
Instead of using an Andrews or Daniels approach, the court in Hogan fo-
cused on the type of injury suffered by plaintiffs.5 7 In North Carolina "'capac-
ity or incapacity to earn wages' "has been the key factor in determining whether
47. Id.
48. Id. at 559-60, 286 S.E.2d at 585.
49. Id. at 560, 286 S.E.2d at 585 (quoting 2A A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 68.21, at 13-29
to -30).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 560-61, 286 S.E.2d at 585.
52. Id. at 560, 286 S.E.2d at 585.
53. Id. The Daniels court employed an "alter-ego" standard, rather than traditional employ-
ment agency principles, for purposes of defining when a co-employee's intentional acts may be attrib-
uted to the employer and the intentional act exception to the exclusive remedy provision invoked.
Use of employment agency principles would have expanded the scope of the intentional act excep-
tion. For a discussion of the circumstances under which employers may be held liable for the actions
of their employees under traditional agency theory, see supra note 18.
54. The Hogan court considered the reasoning of both Andrews and Daniels before choosing to
analyze Hogan differently. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 488-89, 340 S.E.2d at 120.
55. Id. at 488, 340 S.E.2d at 120.
56. Id. at 489, 340 S.E.2d at 120.
57. The court actually considered the exclusive remedy issue prior to holding that plaintiffs
Hogan and Mitchell failed to allege sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct to support their
claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thus, although Cornatzer's claim was ulti-
mately the only claim to avoid summary judgment, the court referred to all three plaintiffs in decid-
ing the exclusivity issue. Id. at 488-93, 340 S.E.2d at 120-22.
[Vol. 65
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a plaintiff is entitled to compensation under the Act.58 The Hogan court held
that because plaintiffs had alleged only mental distress and had not alleged inca-
pacity, plaintiffs' injuries were recoverable in tort but not under the Workers'
Compensation Act. 59 The court concluded that the nature of the wrong and of
the associated injury was such that it was part of "an entire class of civil wrongs
which are outside the scope of the Act."
60
The Hogan court compared its treatment of nonphysical injury torts to
North Carolina's treatment of incidents not arising out of or in the course of
employment, stating that neither of these two types of cases "'come[s] within
the fundamental coverage pattern of the Act.' "61 The class of cases that con-
cerned the court has two essential characteristics: (1) "the essence of the tort, in
law, is non-physical," and (2) "the injuries are of the usual non-physical sort,
with physical injury being at most added to the list of injuries as a make-
weight."' 62 Thus, because the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
essentially is nonphysical and plaintiffs did not claim to have suffered disabling
physical injuries,63 the exclusivity provision did not bar their claims.
64
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals adopted Professor Larson's
view that both the formal, legal elements of a given tort and the injury sustained
by the employee should be considered in determining whether a given wrong
falls within the scope of the Act. 65 Thus, the Hogan court did not hold that the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress always falls outside the scope
of the Act. Rather, its decision more narrowly supports the proposition that
when no physical injury results from the conduct intended to inflict emotional
distress, a civil action can be brought.
Courts and commentators have divided personal injuries involving a mental
or psychic aspect into three separate categories. In the first category a mental
stimulus results in a physical injury, as when an emotionally traumatic event
precipitates a heart attack. This type of injury consistently has been found com-
58. Id. at 489, 340 S.E.2d at 120 (quoting Mills v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 53 N.C. App. 341, 343,
280 S.E.2d 802, 803, disc. rev. denied, 304 N.C. 196, 285 S.E.2d 100 (1981)); see Hall v. Thomason
Chevrolet, Inc., 263 N.C. 569, 574, 139 S.E.2d 857, 861 (1965) ("Under the ... Compensation Act
disability refers not to physical infirmity but to a diminished capacity to earn money.").
59. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 489, 340 S.E.2d at 120.
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting 2A A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 68.30, at 13-40).
62. Id. at 489, 340 S.E.2d at 120-21. The corollary of this standard is that "if the essence of the
action is recovery for physical injury or death, the action should be barred even if it can be cast in the
form of a normally non-physical tort." 2A A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 68.34(a), at 13-63.
63. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 490, 340 S.E.2d at 121. Although the complaints alleged only
severe mental and emotional distress, Record on Appeal at 2, 6, 9, Hogan, April Cornatzer and
Sonya Mitchell claimed in affidavits to have developed ulcers and high blood pressure coupled with
irregular heartbeats, respectively, Record on Appeal at 75, 77, Hogan. For a discussion of mixed
physical and nervous injury, see infra text accompanying notes 95-96.
64. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 490, 340 S.E.2d at 121.
65. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 68.34(a), at 13-61. Professor Larson supported this asser-
tion by comparing the torts of assault and defamation. Although assault often is accompanied by
battery and substantial physical injury, it does not invariably result in physical harm. Conversely,
defamation normally involves injury to one's reputation and self-esteem, but could also conceivably
harm one's physical well-being. Id. at 13-61 to -62.
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pensable under workers' compensation acts.66 The converse, when a physical
trauma or accident produces a psychological effect, also is generally deemed
compensable. 67 In a typical situation, an accident causes physical harm, and the
disabling effects of this trauma are aggravated or prolonged by any one of a
broad range of mental conditions. 68 Courts increasingly have recognized that
"[w]hile psychiatry and psychology may not be exact sciences, they can now
provide sufficiently reliable information concerning causation and treatment of
psychic injuries, to provide ... an intelligent basis for evaluating a particular
claim." 69 North Carolina adheres to this view. In Fayne v. Fieldcrest Mills,
Inc. 70 a psychiatrist testified that plaintiff suffered from a disabling neurotic de-
pressive reaction that was in all likelihood caused by an injury to her back and
related surgery. 7 1 The Fayne court held that a mental condition is covered by
the Act if it results from a compensable, physical injury.
72
The last category of mental or emotional injury, mental stimulus causing
mental reaction, has not been uniformly accepted, although a majority of courts
now find such injuries compensable under workers' compensation acts.73 Prior
to the Hogan decision, North Carolina courts had not squarely addressed
66. 1B A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 42.21(a); see, eg., Miller v. Bingham County, 79 Idaho 87,
89, 310 P.2d 1089, 1090 (1957) (fright from narrow avoidance of a collision with an automobile
carrying children resulting in cerebral hemorrhage); Klein v. Len H. Darling Co., 217 Mich. 485,
488, 187 N.W. 400, 410 (1922) (worker died from shock after he accidentally caused co-worker's
death); Church v. Westchester County, 253 A.D. 859, 859-60, 1 N.Y.S.2d 581, 581 (1938) (coronary
occlusion caused by excitement of testifying at employer's trial).
North Carolina courts have not directly addressed this issue. In Lewter v. Abercrombie Enter.,
Inc., 240 N.C. 399, 405-06, 82 S.E.2d 410, 415-16 (1954), plaintiff's decedent, who had hyperten-
sion, suffered a cerebral hemorrhage shortly after a fire broke out in the movie theater at which she
worked. Decedent was overweight and had a history of high blood pressure. Compensation was
denied on the grounds that the fire was not proven to be a contributing proximate cause. The court
did not discuss whether physical injury or death caused by fright or shock is compensable. Id.
67. IB A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 42.22(a), at 7-601.
68. "Dozens of cases, involving almost every conceivable kind of neurotic, psychotic, psychoso-
matic, depressive, or hysterical symptom, functional overlay, or personality disorder, have accepted
this rule." 1B A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 42.22(a), at 7-601 to -602.
69. Towns v. Anderson, 195 Colo. 517, 519, 579 P.2d 1163, 1164 (1978) (en banc).
70. 54 N.C. App. 144, 282 S.E.2d 539 (1981), disc rev. denied, 304 N.C. 725, 288 S.E.2d 380
(1982).
71. Id. at 146, 282 S.E.2d at 540.
72. Id. at 146-47, 282 S.E.2d at 540. Previous cases had allowed compensation for suicidal
death when pain associated with a compensable physical injury induced derangement. See Petty v.
Associated Transport, Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 428, 173 S.E.2d 321, 329 (1970); Thompson v. Lenoir
Transfer Co., 48 N.C. App. 47, 51, 268 S.E.2d 534, 537, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 405, 273 S.E.2d
450 (1980); see also Hill v. Hanes Corp., 79 N.C. App. 67, 339 S.E.2d I (back injury resulting in
compensable depression), disc. rev. granted, 316 N.C. 376, 342 S.E.2d 895 (1986); Davis v.
Edgecomb Metals, 63 N.C. App. 48, 303 S.E.2d 612 (1983) (post-traumatic neurosis produced by
accidental injury to leg compensable).
73. 1B A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 42.23 n.81. The American Psychiatric Association has
developed a manual to standardize the terms clinicians and research investigators use to refer to
various psychological disorders. Post-traumatic stress disorders are described as follows:
The essential feature is the development of characteristic symptoms following a psy-
chologically traumatic event that is generally outside the range of usual human experi-
ene ....
The stressor producing this syndrome would evoke significant symptoms of distress in
most people .... Stressors producing this disorder include natural disasters (floods, earth-
quakes), accidental man-made disasters (car accidents with serious physical injury, air-
plane crashes, large fires), or deliberate man-made disasters (bombing, torture, death
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whether this type of injury was compensable. Nonetheless, because the court in
Hogan cited plaintiffs' lack of physical injury as the primary reason for allowing
a civil action,74 Hogan can be interpreted as implicitly adopting the view that
"injury" excludes nervous injury caused by psychological stimuli.
In excluding mental injuries caused by mental stimuli from the definition of
"injury," the Hogan court engaged in judicial legislation. The statutory lan-
guage does not distinguish between physical and emotional harms in its defini-
tion of "injury." 7 5 Nor have any prior North Carolina cases drawn the
distinction. Moreover, a disabling mental condition, although not compensable
as a section 97-31 scheduled injury, could fit within the provisions of sections 97-
29 and 97-30, which compensate for a disabling injury in general.7 6 Assuming
arguendo that the Act would not redress a mental injury, "[t]he existence of a
noncompensable injury does not, by itself, abrogate the exclusive remedy provi-
sions of the Workers' Compensation Act."' 77 For example, workers' compensa-
tion statutes fail to compensate loss of taste, smell, or sensation, 78 and pain and
suffering.79 Moreover, the statutes bar recovery in tort for these types or com-
ponents of injury.
camps) .... The disorder is apparently more severe and longer lasting when the stressor is
of human design....
The traumatic event can be reexperienced in a variety of ways. Commonly the indi-
vidual has recurrent painful, intrusive recollections of the event or recurrent dreams or
nightmares during which the event is reexperienced.... Diminished responsiveness to the
external world, referred to as "psychic numbing" or "emotional anesthesia," usually begins
soon after the traumatic event. A person may complain of feeling detached or estranged
from other people, that he or she has lost the ability to become interested in previously
enjoyed significant activities, or that the ability to feel emotions of any type, especially
those associated with intimacy, tenderness, and sexuality, is markedly decreased.
After experiencing the stressor, many develop symptoms of excessive autonomic
arousal, such as hyperalertness, exaggerated startle response, and difficulty falling
asleep .... Some complain of impaired memory or difficulty in concentrating or complet-
ing tasks .... Activities or situations that may arouse recollections of the traumatic event
are often avoided....
Symptoms of depression and anxiety are common, and in some instances may be suffi-
ciently severe to be diagnosed as an Anxiety or Depressive Disorder. Increased irritability
may be associated with sporadic and unpredictable explosions of aggressive behavior, upon
even minimal or no provocation.... Impulsive behavior can occur, such as sudden trips,
unexplained absences, or changes in life-style or residence....
Symptoms may begin immediately or soon after the trauma. It is not unusual, how-
ever, for the symptoms to emerge after a latency period of months or years following the
trauma....
Impairment may either be mild or affect nearly every aspect of life. Phobic avoidance
of situations or activities resembling or symbolizing the original trauma may result in occu-
pational or recreational impairment.
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 236-37 (American Psychiatric
Association 3d ed. 1980) (emphasis added).
74. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 490, 340 S.E.2d at 121.
75. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
76. For a discussion of these statutory provisions, see supra note 29.
77. Renteria v. County of Orange, 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 840, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447, 451 (1978).
78. See, e.g., Arrington v. Stone & Webster Eng'r Corp., 264 N.C. 38, 140 S.E.2d 759 (1965)
(loss of taste and smell not compensable as serious facial or head disfigurement).
79. See, eg., Fleming v. K-Mart Corp., 312 N.C. 538, 324 S.E.2d 214 (1985) (pain and suffering
noncompensable unless it impairs use of extremities).
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In Renteria v. County of Orange,80 a leading case on the relationship of
compensation statutes to intentional infliction of emotional distress, a California
Court of Appeal asserted that intentional infliction of emotional distress was
"not an isolated instance of a physical injury which is noncompensable, but an
entire class of civil wrongs outside the contemplation of the workers' compensa-
tion system."8 1 The Renteria court, however, did not make this conclusion dis-
positive and hold that the exclusive remedy provision did not bar a civil action.
Rather, the court focused on the intentional nature of the conduct and the wide-
spread concern that the workers' compensation system would not sufficiently
deter intentional wrongdoing. 82 The court emphasized that "[i]t would indeed
be ironic if the ... Act, created to benefit employees, were to be interpreted to
shield the employer from all liability for such conduct. ' 83 Thus, the Renteria
court relied heavily on both the intentional nature of the conduct and the non-
physical nature of the injury.
84
The Hogan court declined the opportunity to base its decision on the inten-
tional nature of the conduct.85 As a result, the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals has created an exception to the exclusivity provision without relying on
any apparent statutory, case law, or policy-based support.
Other jurisdictions, unable to distinguish mental stimulus, mental injury
situations from mental-physical or physical-mental cases, have held such injuries
compensable if they are disabling.86 The New York Court of Appeals has noted:
[T]here is nothing in the nature of a stress or shock situation which
ordains physical as opposed to psychological injury .... In a given
situation one person may be susceptible to a heart attack while another
may suffer a depressive reaction. In either case the result is the same-
80. 82 Cal. App. 3d 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1978).
81. Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451 (emphasis added). The Hogan court employed the same
reasoning. See supra text accompanying note 60.
82. Renteria, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 451. The court noted:
While it is possible to believe that the Legislature intended that employees lose their
right to compensation for certain forms of negligently or accidentally inflicted physical
injuries in exchange for a system of workers' compensation featuring liability without fault,
compulsory insurance, and prompt medical care, it is much more difficult to believe that
the Legislature intended the employee to surrender all right to any form of compensation
for mental suffering caused by extreme and outrageous misconduct by an employer.
Id. at 841, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
83. Id.
84. The court noted that another California case, Williams v. Schwartz, 61 Cal. App. 3d 628,
131 Cal. Rptr. 200 (1976), had disposed of the exclusivity issue as it applied to negligently inflicted
emotional distress. Williams held that recovery for such injuries was limited to the workers' com-
pensation system. Renteria, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 839 n.3, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 450 n.3 (citing Williams,
61 Cal. App. 3d at 633-34, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 203). This suggests that the Renteria court was not
primarily concerned with the physical/nonphysical distinction.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
86. See, ag., Brock v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Ariz. App. 95, 486 P.2d 207 (1971); International
Harvester v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 116 Wis. 2d 298, 341 N.W.2d 721 (Wis. Ct. App.
1983); Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885 (Wyo. 1984); cf. Hackett v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 195 So. 2d 758 (La. Ct. App. 1967) (witness to fatal dynamite blast denied compensation due to
lack of physical trauma); Egeland v. City of Minneapolis, 344 N.W.2d 597 (Minn. 1984) (compensa-
tion for policeman's depression denied); Vernon v. Seven-Eleven Stores, 547 P.2d 1300 (Okla. 1976)
(neurosis resulting from failure of polygraph test and subsequent termination not an accidental
injury).
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the individual is incapable of functioning properly because of an acci-
dent and should be compensated under the Workmen's Compensation
Law.
8 7
In Bailey v. American General Insurance Co. 88 the Texas Supreme Court
held that a steel worker, who watched a co-worker fall from a scaffold to his
death, sustained a disabling neurosis and was entitled to compensation under the
Texas Workers' Compensation Act.8 9 The court reached this conclusion despite
Texas' restrictive definition of "injury"-"damage or harm to the physicalstruc-
ture of the body." 90 Stating that the "structure should be considered that of a
living person-not as a static, inanimate thing," the court interpreted injury to
include mental harms.9 1
The Hogan court's refusal to place mental stimulus/mental injuries on
equal footing with injuries involving physical stimuli will likely have far-reach-
ing implications for both potential claimants and their employers. The deci-
sion's most significant effect is that some tort claims will be permitted against
employers while other claims based on identical circumstances will be barred.
For example, when a co-employee is so successful in his or her effort to inflict
emotional harm that the injured party suffers not only nervous or emotional
symptoms but also a heart attack or ulcers, the workers' compensation system
will afford the only remedy against the employer. If the claimant is disabled, he
or she will be compensated accordingly. If the claimant is not disabled, he or
she will go without remedy. If, however, the same conduct results only in
psychic injury or in psychic harm accompanied only by "makeweight" 92 physi-
cal injury, a tort action against the employer will be permitted if the plaintiff can
satisfy general agency principles.93 Even if the plaintiff is disabled and therefore
could have been compensated under the Act, he or she may seek full redress in a
civil forum. Similar anomolous results will occur in the case of unintentional
psychic trauma that causes mental injury.
The inequities that may result from the Hogan decision are emphasized by
the difference in remedies available under the tort system and under workers'
compensation statutes.94 The serious combination of mental and physical injury
will likely be compensated only to a limited extent under the Act. A claimant
87. Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 510, 330 N.E.2d 603, 606, 369
N.Y.S.2d 637, 641 (1975).
88. 154 Tex. 430, 279 S.W.2d 315 (1955).
89. Id. at 432, 279 S.W.2d at 316.
90. Id. at 435, 279 S.W.2d at 318.
91. "The phrase 'physical structure of the body,' as it is used in the statue [sic], must refer to
the entire body, not simply to the skeletal structure or to the circulatory system or to the digestive
system. It refers to the whole .... Id. at 436, 279 S.W.2d at 318.
92. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 489, 340 S.E.2d at 120-21 (citing 2A A. LARSON, supra note 23,
§ 68.30).
93. The plaintiff would have to show circumstances that would justify charging the co-em-
ployee's tort to the employer. For a discussion of employment agency principles, see supra note 18.
94. The tort system offers a full range of damages, including punitive damages, pain and suffer-
ing, and 100% of lost wages. Kawaler, Intentional Torts Under Workers' Compensation Statutes: A
Blessing or a Burden?, 12 HOFSrRA L. REv. 181, 185 (1983). In contrast, workers' compensation
only redresses two-thirds of lost wages. See supra note 29.
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sustaining such a combination of injuries will receive only reduced wages, and
only if he or she is disabled. The employee who suffers only mental trauma will
be able to recover in tort for pain and suffering and possibly punitive damages,
regardless of whether he or she has been able to work since the accident
occurred.
Another consequence of the physical injury/mental injury distinction is
that both employers and employees will be unsure about the appropriate forum
for resolution of a claim based on a physical injury. Because each factual situa-
tion is different, the question whether an injury's physical component is only
"makeweight" necessarily will require litigation on an ad hoc basis. As a result,
one of the purposes of the Act, "to provide swift and sure compensation to in-
jured workers without the necessity of protracted litigation," 95 will be defeated.
Furthermore, plaintiffs will face a dilemma when drafting their complaints.
By adding physical symptoms to mental distress, a plaintiff will be able to em-
phasize the genuineness of the claim as well as increase the potential judgment.
The more severe the physical injury pleaded, however, the greater the risk that
the plaintiff's civil action will be barred. The court may deem the plaintiff's
injuries to be essentially physical and, therefore, covered solely by the Workers'
Compensation Act.
96
Courts in other jurisdictions have approached the issue of psychic harm
from different perspectives. Some courts have focused on the unintentional or
intentional nature of the conduct involved.97 Mental and physical harms are not
distinguished, but civil actions against the employer are allowed for the inten-
tionally tortious conduct of the employer or its alter ego. 98 These jurisdictions
have permitted tort actions for not only the intentional infliction of emotional
distress,99 but also for defamation, 10° false imprisonment, 10 1 assault, and offen-
sive battery.10 2 Had the Hogan court employed this reasoning, it could have
integrated the treatment of mental harms into existing case law without creating
another exception to the exclusivity provision.10 3 In addition, judgments would
be more predictable because the intentional/accidental distinction provides a
bright line for establishing the extent of the compensation system's coverage.
95. Rorie v. Holly Farms Poultry Co., 306 N.C. 706, 709, 295 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1982).
96. Kawaler, supra note 94, at 197.
97. See, eg., Renteria, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 833, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 447. See generally Love,
Actions for Nonphysical Harm: The Relationship Between the Tort System and No-Fault Compensa-
tion (With An Emphasis on Workers' Compensation), 73 CAL. L. REV. 857, 869-70 (1985) (noting
that several state courts define accidental injury from the actor's point of view, citing Daniels).
98. This is the reasoning used by the Daniels court. Daniels, 55 N.C. App. at 560, 286 S.E.2d at
585; see, e.g., Thompson v. Maimonides Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308 (1982)
(relying in part on Wolfe v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 330 N.E.2d 603, 369
N,Y.S.2d 637 (1975)). See generally 2A A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 68.11 (employer cannot allege
injury is accidental if he or she acts intentionally).
99. See, eg., Thompson v. Maimonides Medical Center, 86 A.D.2d 867, 447 N.Y.S.2d 308
(1982).
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Skelton v. W.T. Grant Co., 331 F.2d 593 (5th Cir.) (applying Georgia law), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 830 (1964); Miller v. McRae's, Inc., 444 So. 2d 368 (Miss. 1984).
102. See, e.g., Leopold v. Britt, 58 A.D.2d 856, 396 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1977).
103. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
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Other courts have focused on the "arising out of employment" require-
ment 1° 4 and have held that certain intentional torts did not arise out of employ-
ment,10 5 especially when the employer specifically aimed to inflict nonphysical
harm.10 6 Although this method is more difficult to apply than the intentional/
accidental distinction, its flexibility allows courts to promote the compensation
statute's underlying policies.107
Although Hogan was not decided on the basis of the Act's "arising out of"
language, it could have been. In determining whether Pfeiffer had acted as an
agent of the country club, the court noted that the chef had not acted within the
scope of his employment, but rather for his own "corrupt or lascivious" pur-
poses.108 Had the court similarly focused on the specific conduct of Pfeiffer's
alleged sexual harassment when deciding whether the Workers' Compensation
Act was plaintiff's exclusive remedy, it could have reached the same conclusion
without also implicitly holding that nervous or emotional injury stemming from
psychological trauma is not compensable under the Act.
The various approaches to the issue of psychic harm assume that a choice
must be made between the workers' compensation system and traditional tort
law. Commentators and some courts support remedial schemes that differ from
the traditional "either-or" or "alternative action" approach. One scheme, the
cumulative action theory, 10 9 allows a plaintiff to seek recovery both in tort and
under the Act. 110 Under this approach, no-fault benefits offset any tort judg-
ment to prevent double recovery."1  Three states have statutes1 12 that expressly
104. See, e.g., Lagies v. Copley, 110 Cal. App. 3d 958, 970, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368, 375 (1980);
Tredway v. District of Columbia, 403 A.2d 732, 734-35 (D.C.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 867 (1979);
McKinley v. Holiday Inn, 115 Mich. App. 160, 162, 320 N.W.2d 329, 331 (1982) (per curiam). See
generally Love, supra note 97, at 874 (rationale of "arising out of" theory is that workers' compensa-
tion should be the plaintiff's remedy only for injury caused by "the ordinary risks of employment").
105. See, e.g., Iverson v. Atlas Pac. Eng'g, 143 Cal. App. 3d 219, 191 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1983)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment); Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 381
Mass. 545, 413 N.E.2d 711 (1980) (defamation). Contra Harned v. Farmland Foods, Inc., 331
N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 1983) (distinguishing intentional denial of care from other intentional torts for
which civil action permitted); Baker v. Wendy's of Montana, Inc., 687 P.2d 885, 891-92 (Wyo. 1984)
(intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault, and battery resulting from sexual harassment
have sufficient causal nexus to employment).
106. See, e.g., Bennett v. Furr's Cafeterias, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 887, 890-91 (D. Colo. 1982) (not
deciding specific intent issue); Kandt v. Evans, 645 P.2d 1300, 1304 (Colo. 1982) (dictum noting that
there is "some justification ... for not [barring] intentional tort actions when it is the employer
personally... who commits the tort"); Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 81 Ill. 2d 229, 238-39, 408
N.E.2d 198, 202 (1980) (dictum noting the distinction between acts "commanded or expressly au-
thorized" by the employer and regular accident); Barnes v. Double Seal Glass Co., 129 Mich. App.
66, 78-83, 341 N.W.2d 812, 818-20 (1983) (Burns, J., concurring).
107. Love, supra note 97, at 875-76.
108. Hogan, 79 N.C. App. at 492, 340 S.E.2d at 122.
109. Love, supra note 97, at 860.
110. Love, supra note 97, at 860. The cumulative action theory is more compensatory and puni-
tive than the alternative action approach and is a more valuable deterrent. This theory is also easier
to administer than other approaches, because a plaintiff's civil and statutory claims can be processed
at the same time. However, because "[t]he cumulative action theory conflicts... with the no-fault
objective of limiting a defendant's tort liability for compensatory damages.., the theory should be
recognized only to protect highly valued interests or to punish and deter serious misconduct." Id. at
894-95.
111. Love, supra note 97, at 894-95.
112. See OR. REV. STAT. § 656.156 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (Supp. 1986);
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authorize such actions when the employer specifically intends to produce injury
or death.' 3 This approach, however, has been applied sparingly to actions for
nonphysical injury.'14
Another alternative is the cumulative remedy theory, which allows recov-
ery under the compensation act for the types of injuries covered by the statute
and also permits a civil action for all injuries not covered by the compensation
act.115 Statutory compensation limits are honored for injuries compensable
under the statute, but punitive damages and damages for noncompensable psy-
chological harm are available through the tort system. No state legislature has
expressly provided for a cumulative remedy, but several courts have moved to-
ward use of this theory."
16
At least one commentator has advanced the cumulative remedy theory as
preferable to Professor Larson's physical/nonphysical distinction.' 17 The cu-
mulative remedy theory "allows the no-fault plan to perform the compensatory
function which it was designed to serve, and authorizes the tort system to vindi-
cate dignitary interests and punish egregious misconduct."' 118 The theory also
encourages the use of no-fault penalties or administrative fines, which could be
supported by punitive damages in the most flagrant cases of intentional tortious
conduct. 1 19
In giving effect to the exclusive remedy provision of the Act only when
physical injury is present, the Hogan court has formulated a principle that will
be difficult to apply, will produce inequitable results in different factual settings,
and is inconsistent with prior North Carolina case law. There are no notable
differences between physical and psychic injury that support the court's holding.
The court of appeals in Hogan should have applied workers' compensation doc-
trine as laid out in Andrews and Daniels consistently, rather than create an artifi-
cial distinction based on the existence of some elusive degree of physical injury.
It is for the North Carolina General Assembly to change the benefit scheme to
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(b) (1985). No plaintiff has successfully brought a tort action solely for
mental harm under these statutes.
113. Love, supra note 97, at 861.
114. It is difficult in a nonphysical injury case to prove the actor specifically intended to inflict
mental or emotional injury. Love, supra note 97, at 863-64.
115. Love, supra note 97, at 860.
116. A few California and Michigan decisions have allowed a tort action for damage to some
dignitary interest when physical or mental injuries had previously been settled through the workers'
compensation system. See Howland v. Balma, 143 Cal. App. 3d 899, 192 Cal. Rptr. 286 (1983)
(permitting separate civil action for slander); McCalla v. Ellis, 129 Mich. App. 452, 341 N.W.2d 525
(1983) (permitting civil action for sexual discrimination); Slayton v. Michigan Host, Inc., 122 Mich.
App. 411, 332 N.W.2d 498 (1983) (allowing separate civil action for mental anguish, loss of profes-
sional esteem, and damage to plaintiff's career). Several state courts have permitted both no-fault
compensation for an injury and a tort action for a distinct nonphysical harm that an employer later
inflicted. See 2A A. LARSON, supra note 23, § 68.34(b)-(c).
117. Love, supra note 97, at 889.
118. Love, supra note 97, at 896.
119. Love, supra note 97, at 896.
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compensate for pain and suffering or nondisabling emotional distress or to re-
serve certain civil actions related to the employment relationship.
MARY ELIZABETH MOORE
